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Is the Indonesian Transition a Model for the 
Arab Spring? 
 
Paul J. Carnegie 
Introduction
1
 
Over the last two years, the ‘Indonesian model’ has become an increasingly repeated mantra in 
media and policy circles. It seems to hold the promise of a ‘road map’ for the nascent transitions 
taking place in the Arab world. I can see the logic and appeal here. Simply stated, Indonesia is 
the most populous Muslim country on the planet and in the decade and more since the downfall 
of Suharto; it has successfully, if not always without difficulty, transitioned from authoritarian 
rule to a functioning democracy.  At the same time, initial concerns over Islamist ascendancy 
have proved largely unfounded. In fact, Indonesia accommodates a diversity of Islamic political 
expression within the framework of democratic electoral politics. Which explains the recent 
interest and raises the question what lessons, if any, can we draw from it? 
 
I think the most important thing to say at this stage is that we need to proceed with caution 
before we hold up the ‘Indonesian model’ as a general panacea. There are some real differences 
between the transition that took place in Indonesia and the events unfolding in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Having said this, the following paper aims to render these political 
events, even at their most chaotic, slightly more intelligible and slightly less incoherent. It seeks 
to gain some analytical purchase on what is unfolding in the MENA region by drawing together 
what are hopefully some prudent comparative insights.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Dr. Paul J. Carnegie is senior lecturer in political science at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei 
Darussalam. He is the author of The Road from Authoritarianism to Democratization in Indonesia (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) and his research on democratic transitions is published in leading international journals like 
Pacific Affairs and the Middle East Quarterly. He has taught previously in Australia, Egypt and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
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Background on political Islam in Indonesia 
Firstly, Indonesia’s history, geography and demographic make-up have led to a plurality of 
Islamic expression across the archipelago. One need only look at the size of Indonesia’s two 
major socio-religious organizations to appreciate the influence of Islam in daily life. The 
traditionalist Sunni Nahdlatul Ulama (NU -Awakening of Ulama) boasts about 30-35 million 
members whilst the reformist Muhammadiyah numbers approximately 29 million (Saleh 2001). 
Yet, a united Islamist front with a strongly orthodox agenda remains a distinctly remote 
possibility in Indonesia. This situation has a historical context. 
The modern Indonesian state has not always had an easy relationship with the polity’s cultural-
religious identification. Historically, there has been acknowledgment of Islam but also a 
containment of its political appeal at state-level especially in the face of emergence of the post-
independence Pancasila state. The nationalism and nation-state building projects of both 
Sukarno and Suharto imposed major restrictions on the former. Following the traumatic events of 
1965 and the ascendancy of Orde Baru (New Order), Suharto was keen to stymie any challenges 
to his authority. This involved a major overhaul of the electoral system in 1971 that effectively 
de-Islamised Indonesia’s state-level political structures. It ensured the electoral dominance of 
Golkar by forcing the major Islamic organisations to align under the banner of a regime co-opted 
political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP - the United Development Party).  
Having said this, Suharto’s attempts remained only partially successful in subsuming the polity’s 
Islamic identification to the diktats of New Order corporatism. In reality, his marginalisation of 
political Islam precipitated greater civil society activity on its part. Rather than challenge directly 
for political power, reformists like Dawan Rahardjo, Djohan Effendi and Nurcholish Madjid 
focused on building a strong and dynamic Islamic community based on education and social 
welfare. By the 1990s, they had helped form Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI - 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals). Their ideas on Islamic social and educational renewal 
emerged in close association with Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI – Islamic Students 
Association). Their work and that of the conservatively orthodox Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI 
– Indonesian Ulama Council), helped restore Islamic issues onto the political agenda especially 
with Suharto courting Islamic support as a counter to growing pro-democracy sentiment and 
rumbling military dissent. Major figureheads within ICMI such as Amien Rais, Sri Bintang 
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Pamungkas, Eggy Sudjanan, Din Syamsudin and Adi Sasono symbolised this growing Islamic 
political influence. Although this shored up Suharto’s increasingly friable authority, the strategy 
eventually backfired in the wake of the devastating Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  
Given the aforementioned context, the prospect of a united Islamist front is remote in Indonesia. 
Yet, at the same time, it is fairly accurate to say that developments in the post-Suharto party 
system did introduce political players with stricter forms of Muslim identity politics capable of 
appealing to major Muslim constituencies. These include PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa - 
National Awakening Party), PAN (Partai Amanat Rakyat - National Mandate Party), PBB 
(Partai Bulan Bintang - Crescent and Star Party) and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera - 
Prosperous Justice Party formerly PK - Partai Keadilan). Similar to Malaysia, Islamic revivalism 
among sections of the Indonesian middle classes has no doubt helped bolster this appeal. The 
likes of Hidayat Nur Wahid’s PKS and Yusril Izha Mahendra’s PBB appeal mostly to sections of 
more conservative-minded, urban middle classes with an interest in promoting social decency, 
political moderation, and piety based on Islam as an ethical reference. The moral concerns of 
these constituencies combined with feelings of uncertainty toward social change in the face of 
rapid development no doubt helped bolster this appeal.  
Yet, whilst the number of Islamic parties is more prevalent than at any time in Indonesia’s past, 
most of their involvement is of a moderate kind and very far from being associated with the 
institution of an Islamist theocracy. Moreover, the results of the first democratic elections of the 
post-Suharto era in 1999 indicated clearly that Indonesians en masse favored a democratic polity 
over an Islamic state, giving the secularist-nationalist parties of the Indonesian Democratic 
Party-Struggle and the Golkar party 58.3 percent of the vote while the various Islamic parties 
amassed less than 42 percent.2 True, the Islamist, PKS whose leaders claim it does not seek to 
impose Shari‘a (despite links to the Muslim Brotherhood), increased its vote from 1.5 percent in 
                                                          
2 See Komisi Pemilihan Umum, “Indonesian elections with figures and facts 1955-1999,” General Elections 
Commission, Jakarta, 2000. The 1999 election results: PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) 37.4%; Golkar 
 20.9%; PKB (National Awakening Party) 12.6%; PPP (Unity and Development Party) 10.7% and PAN (National 
Mandate Party) 7.13%; PBB (Crescent and Star Party) 1.8% and PK (Justice Party) 1.5%. 
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1999 to 7.45 percent in 2004.3 Having said this, a large part of this success rested on its image as 
a relatively new and untainted party, as well as the stagnation and subsequent unraveling of 
Megawati’s tenure. The PKS leadership skillfully exploited the situation to cast itself as a 
“clean” Islamic party committed to an anti-corruption platform, rather than to the imposition of 
Shari‘a rule. Although the public’s perception of it has tarnished somewhat over the years, 
especially recently with the investigations by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), it 
marginally increased its share in the People’s Representative Council (the Indonesian version of 
the House of Representatives) in the 2009 elections to 7.88 percent.  
Most significantly, the PKS and other Islamic-oriented groups represent only 169 out of 560 
seats in parliament - a mere 30 percent. Even the PKS has struggled to consolidate a solid 
constituency base in the regions capable of undermining the predominance of Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah. The sweeping electoral triumph of the secular-nationalist Democratic Party 
(Partai Demokrat or PD) in 2009 with 148 seats alongside the more established Golkar and 
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle groups (106 and 94 seats respectively) indicates that 
Islam does not necessarily trump other interests or issues in Indonesia. This is in some contrast to 
the much more united Islamist Ennahda in Tunisia or the Muslim Brotherhood linked Freedom 
and Justice Party (FJP - Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya Wal -’Adala) and Salafist Al-Nour in Egypt. The recent 
Islamist electoral successes Ennahda in Tunisia and the FJP and Salafist Al-Nour in Egypt 
suggest a different political dynamic than Indonesia. Ennahda and Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya Wal -’Adala 
are certainly more organised political blocs.  
Moreover, given the context of the New Order era, some of the key figures in the reformasi 
struggle (the prominent Islamic leaders, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais and the late 
Nurcholish Madjid) played instrumental roles in maintaining public support for democratic 
change and urging restraint. Their links to Muslim activists on the front line of the student 
protests and rallies against Suharto allowed them to emphasize the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy, political rights and justice. These leading figures and their associated organisations 
                                                          
3 See Komisi Pemilihan Umum, (2004). “Results of vote count.” General Elections Commission: Jakarta.  PKS 
increased its 2004 vote from 1.5 % to 7.45 % -- Golkar 21.6%; PDI-P 18.5%; PKB 10.57%; PPP 8.15%; PD 7.45%; and 
PAN - 6.43%.  
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also played major roles in the aftermath of the downfall by helping to disseminate democratic 
values throughout society via voter education and election monitoring. The underscoring of 
moderation and support for Pancasila was crucially important in the turmoil surrounding 
Suharto’s downfall as it prevented calls for the creation of an Islamic state gaining any sort of 
credence. Appeals to Indonesians’ sense of tolerance and national pride took precedence, 
something replicated in many of the initial uprisings of the Arab Spring. It remains to be seen 
whether Tunisia’s Ennahda and Egypt’s FJP and Al-Nour will do the same over the long term.  
 
Lessons, if any? 
I think the main thing the Indonesian experience highlights is that countries do not emerge in 
straightforward transitions from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy overnight. Let us not 
fool ourselves the challenges of transition are multiple and difficult. It is all too easy to assume 
that when a country enters a transition from authoritarian rule it is inextricably moving towards 
democracy. This is a false assumption. The process is as susceptible to stall, breakdown or retreat 
back into what Marina Ottaway (2003: 3-19) has termed a ‘semi-authoritarian condition’.  
Success, if it can even be called that, depends on translating momentum for change into 
representational capacity with the ability to yield meaningful reform and improvements that can 
sustain over time. This involves addressing transitional justice, effective political reform and 
economic stabilisation while negotiating the pitfalls of complex local terrains -- not to mention 
popular legitimation, judicial reform, diffusing democratic values, marginalizing anti-system 
actors, ensuring greater civilian rule over the military, removal of reserved authoritarian 
domains, party-system development and the routinisation of politics (Schedler 1998: 91-107).  
 
Indonesia has faced substantial challenges (and still does) but, at the same time, it has registered 
some significant achievements over the 13 years since its initial transition. To put it another way, 
there are no simple categorisations, rather matters of time and degree. The legacies of the past 
have certainly made democratic re-arrangement vis-à-vis political power a complicated affair. 
This helps us recognize that democratisation is not the same as democracy, it is a process and 
rarely, if ever, ideal. We have to remember that there is a distinction between the political system 
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(democracy) and the process of establishing that system (democratisation). Indonesia’s 
transformation, in common with other democratizations, has been anything but easy. 
Nevertheless, what it does show us is that democracy can become the “only game in town” when 
change occurs incrementally on the behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional levels.  
After all, successful democratization is really about acceptance. That is to say, relevant political 
forces have to work out how best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain 
interplay of democratic institutions (Przeworski 1991: 26). This takes time, commitment, 
vigilance and no small amount of good luck. Indonesia has managed to come through such a 
process albeit not without difficulty. There may be ongoing policy ineffectiveness, judicial 
problems, institutional frictions and corruption issues but what is clear is that there has been 
substantive reform. The political system is now a functioning democracy with all the benefits 
and shortcomings that brings with it.  
Now obviously, Indonesia is neither Arab nor in the Middle East or North Africa. We have to 
acknowledge that time and context differ, political cultures differ, configurations of economic 
elites differ, patterns of civil-military relations differ, as do respective positions within the 
international system of power and privilege, all to greater or lesser extents. Distinct conditioning 
factors will no doubt affect change in the MENA in different ways and external reactionary 
forces certainly exert a stronger pull. Nevertheless, if the ‘Arab Spring’ is to bring about lasting 
change for the better then replicating some of what has actually worked in Indonesia may be a 
place to start. 
 
Free and Fair Elections 
Firstly, there is the organization of free and fair elections to contend with in circumstances of 
flux and instability. A word of warning here, there is little point in assuming that elections in 
isolation will simply channel contests among political rivals and accord public legitimacy. There 
also has to be correspondent reform of state institutions, policymaking procedures and attendant 
recovery of civil liberties, i.e. elected officials, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, 
enhanced freedom of expression, access to alternative information, and expansion of 
associational autonomy. Indonesia’s first two elections in 1999 and 2004 were the freest in more 
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than forty years with huge amounts of political activity and media coverage. The lifting of press 
restrictions, the release of political prisoners, and allowing the formation of new political parties 
all bore witness to its climate of reform.  
 
Getting the military back in the barracks 
Secondly, dismantling the most repressive structures of an authoritarian regime and removing the 
military gradually from politics are major tasks of reform. In the current situation, this means 
reigning in the excessive power and nefarious practices of the internal security services, aka 
Mukhabarat. Pragmatism and a distinct fear of grass-root insurrection may eventually force this 
issue but doing it while public demand is strong is a good idea. In Indonesia, political leaders 
moved quickly to separate the police from the military. Having the military onside will be 
essential especially in former autocracies like Tunisia and Egypt. Turning them in to an asset 
rather than a threat to the process is a challenge right enough but not insurmountable. Persuading 
the military to ‘return to the barracks’ involves investment in their professionalism (which will 
cost money) and an appeal to their sense of honor. They have to realise that their job is to ensure 
stability by upholding the constitutionally mandated institutions of public interest.  
To prevent a reactionary backlash, allowing the military to retain substantial economic interests 
is a prudent move if a difficult pill to swallow (in the short term at least). However, a word of 
warning here, this cannot just be some sort of perverse exchange between essentially status quo 
forces. We must be exceptionally wary of ‘grand bargains’ being struck whereby political 
hegemony is transferred on the assurance that the military unconditionally retains its reserved 
economic domains and privileged status. Rather, it must be with the intention of creating enough 
time and space to actually institute some step-by-step reforms, the aim being to phase out 
gradually military embeddedness in the body politic.  
Indonesia managed to reduce the socio-political role of their Armed Forces (TNI - Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia) by allowing them to retain their substantial economic interests in the short 
term at least. Phasing this out gradually is proving a challenging process in Indonesia yet it did 
pave the way for constitutional reform of the TNI’s dual function (dwifungsi) role in 2002 and 
the formal removal of their allocated seats in parliament in 2004. All of which, overtime brought 
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improved civilian rule over the military, albeit by degrees. This can then feed in to 
considerations about transitional justice. Often times a society needs to allow some of its “open 
wounds” to heal so that it can move on. It is an incredibly fraught and thorny process but one 
way to do this is to give them a good ‘airing’. This may involve the establishment of some form 
of truth and reconciliation commission as in East Timor (not particularly effective), depending 
on circumstance.  
 
Transitional Justice 
Thirdly, given the atrocities taking place in Syria, if the Assad regime falls then some sort of 
commission would seem almost inevitable for a meaningful and stable future in that country. The 
scale of the regime’s violence and the country’s crosscutting sectarian rivalries make the 
potential for wide-scale retribution and bloodletting a very real prospect. Moreover, the 
commanders heading up the paramilitary Shabiha units in Syria who are carrying out some of the 
worst crimes against the populace should be pursued with the same tenacity by the international 
community as similar such figures have been in the former Yugoslavia. Future prosecutions at 
the International Criminal Court for the worst offenders of the Syrian regime would send a 
strong message. Such steps are important in post conflict situations as they provide mortar to 
rebuild respect for state institutions and the rule of law. Restoring pride and trust in institutions 
such as the judiciary, law enforcement and security services is a massive task of reform that will 
take time and substantial effort. This also encompasses the fight against endemic corruption, 
cronyism, and nepotism as vital components in restoring pride and trust. 
 
Institutional Reform  
Fourthly, major constitutional and decentralisation reform are fraught with difficulties and 
usually uneven in their impacts but they can bring about improvements in representation and 
accountability, albeit by degrees. The restructured People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR - 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) now consists entirely of popularly elected members sitting in 
the People’s Representative Council (DPR - Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and the new Regional 
Representatives Council (DPD - Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). The inauguration of the new DPD 
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was symbolically (and potentially structurally) a significant step. It, in effect, creates a bicameral 
second chamber of parliament that acts as a sort of upper house but it has to be said with 
extremely limited powers. For instance, the DPD possesses no veto over the budget. Having 
said this, altering the composition of parliament may lessen regional distrust of central 
government. In theory, there is the potential to give diverse communities a greater 
representational presence in Jakarta but the practice is considerably more ambiguous. Likewise, 
for instance, since 2005, pilkada (local elections) for hundreds of governors (gubernur), regents 
(bupati) and city mayors (walikota) has certainly altered personnel with about 40 percent of 
incumbents replaced but whether that has dramatically changed the new incumbents’ priorities is 
hard to gauge. Yet, greater competition for office, logistically at least, represents a gradual 
dilution of the system of top-down executive appointments and manipulated assembly votes. In 
fact, Indonesia’s 2004 elections played witness to a meaningful and extensive number of 
permitted political parties, stabilized election rules, amendments to decentralization legislation 
and constitutional limitations on the power of the executive. The success of Indonesia’s 2009 
elections further attests to real stabilization and routinisation. Most important for ensuring all of 
this is the fact that the new democratic framework is accepted. The current president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) may be ex-military but he is committed to and readily submits his 
interests and values to the new ‘rules of the game’. This is not to say things are all plain sailing. 
In terms of institutionalization, the party system is still captive to personality politics and most 
parties are widely seen as corrupt and self-interested (Johnson Tan 2006: 88-114). 
 
Radical Islamist Ascendancy 
Fifthly, this brings us on to a major concern for future developments in the Arab world, i.e. the 
spectre of radical Islamist ascendancy. Any attempts to curb this are sensitive political issues. In 
the past, many Islamist groups in the Middle East have prospered off the deficiencies of autocrats 
by stepping in where the regimes had so abjectly failed, i.e. the provision of education, health 
and sanitation for the poorest in society. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salifist movement are 
prime examples in Egypt.  
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There is no reason to assume that developments in the Arab world will necessarily reflect 
western norms. But, if Indonesia teaches us anything, they do not need to and will be no less a 
democracy for that, if that is indeed what eventuates. In Indonesia, Islamist parties do exist, but 
most importantly, they accept, operate and are contained within the electoral rules of democratic 
contestation. Indonesia shows that moderate Islam and democratic development are not 
incompatible bedfellows. What emerges might not meet a western liberal definition of 
democracy but there is no one-size-fits-all definition of democracy rather many variations. 
Islamic political parties will no doubt represent an important and necessary part of any 
prospective democratic evolution in the MENA region. 
To be sure, as mentioned earlier, the recent Islamist electoral successes in Tunisia and Egypt 
suggest a different political dynamic than Indonesia. Nevertheless, the tenor of the uprisings, at 
least in their initial phases, as well as subsequent reactions to authoritarian behaviour by elected 
Islamist officials, indicate that a substantial number of people in these countries, as in Indonesia, 
will expect parties to respect the rule of law and address their countries’ economic and 
corruption problems. If not, we can expect more protests. Just look at the public backlash to the 
assassination of opposition figures Shokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi in Tunisia and the rule 
of Mohamed Morsi’s FJP in Egypt. Attempts at a coercive institutionalisation of Islamist 
theocracy can and will be met with continued protests and uprisings.  
However, the current situation in Egypt is unfortunately a truly worrying and ironic example of 
the uncertainty and turbulence of transitions. Although the liberal-secularist groupings in Egypt 
have been annoyed by and highly critical of Morsi’s style of leadership and failures of his parties 
rule they may have taken what could be a disastrous shortcut that may bring deleterious 
repercussions in the long-term. Joining forces with the military to wash out the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s supremacy in Egypt will be full of unintended consequences. General Sisi’s 
government is the return of a ruler with an iron fist. Taking out political opponents outside 
legitimate general elections and reinstituting emergency laws is no sign of democratic progress. 
One of the measures of democratic consolidation is the peaceful transfers of power through free 
and fair elections alongside greater civilian control over the military. The Indonesian’s have a 
phrase for it: lepas dari mulut buaya, masuk mulut harimau (free from the crocodile’s mouth, but 
into the mouth of a lion). 
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Translating frustrations into reform 
Clearly, there are no guarantees during a transition but Indonesia shows us that a commitment to 
systematic reforms and increased contestation can bring compromise, progress and acceptance. 
The real issue for the Middle East is not whether it will be secular or Islamic. In many ways, this 
is a false dichotomy and distraction from much more pressing concerns. What we have and are 
witnessing in the MENA region is a simultaneous convergence of multiple social, economic and 
political vectors bringing things into sharp relief. Overwhelmingly, the failures of corrupt, 
repressive and ossified autocratic regimes have come home to roost. If we look at the conditions 
in these countries, there are some pretty clear clues to the storms that were brewing. We all know 
that there was and are massive inequalities in wealth distribution. Despite substantial wealth 
generation that narrow self-serving politico-business-military elites enjoyed some of which 
trickled down to the middle classes, economic stagnation was and is rife. Combine this with 
rising prices of basic foodstuffs and high unemployment amongst educated, tech savvy but 
disenfranchised sections of youthful populaces and you have an extremely volatile mix. Events 
in Tunisia simply provided the catalytic stimulus to set in train a cathartic outpouring of wider 
frustrations few anticipated but not all were surprised at when things finally erupted. What the 
people of the region now have to do is find ways to strike a different ‘social contract’ by 
translating the popular social momentum for greater political freedoms, effective rule of law and 
better living conditions (that brought down their autocrats) into representative capacity. As in 
Indonesia, this means establishing political competition and relevant political forces learning 
how to operate within the new ‘rules of the game’ if they are to have influence.  
 
Conclusion 
Please do not think I am being overly optimistic here, I am not. One need only look at the 
tragedy unfolding in Syria to get a grim reminder of the odious brutality of authoritarian regimes. 
Especially when you have a despot desperate to cling to power shored up by the geostrategic 
interests of powerful international actors, namely Iran, Russia and to a lesser extent China. 
Leaving Syria (not forgetting Bahrain) aside for a moment as it is some way short of being at the 
same stage as other ‘uprising’ countries, the present moment in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
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Yemen is now a transition period. An entrance into uncertainty characterized by opportunity but 
also fraught with danger. While there is no denying the significance of their uprisings, an 
unfettered triumphalism is premature at this stage.  
The ousting of Ben Ali, Mubarak et al is a sign of encouragement, a first profound step yes but 
just a beginning, an opening. As I have said all along, the real work and the real difficulties start 
after the downfalls. We are already seeing that the new rules of the political game are not yet 
defined and most definitely, in flux. They are and will be fiercely contested. The organisational 
structures of the old regimes in these countries have not just vanished and their legacies will not 
simply disappear. There is strong residual presence, which will continue to constrain reform even 
as the old institutional structures unravel. We can expect ‘old’ actors to contest for power as they 
try to stage a return to the political arena in different ways. It is, therefore, of more importance 
for countries like Tunisia and Egypt to focus on the slow and difficult process of diminishing 
power asymmetries by constitutionally de-coupling the corrupt and corrupting nexus between 
politics, business and the military. This will require courage on all sides. Leaders of emerging 
oppositions will need to negotiate with regime moderates and seize the opportunity provided by 
the uprisings to push hard for concessions from disoriented regimes. Keeping them honest, as 
Australians would say, is bolstered by the fact that popular attitudes are well tempered by strong 
doses of mistrust towards established political circles.  
The international community must also be careful not to deprive these events of their most 
powerful aspect. They are mass popular uprisings against repressive rule. Ones that have directly 
contradicted the hegemonic narratives long spun by these regimes that their secular strongmen 
were both the guarantors of stability and the only bulwark against a fanatical Islamist takeover. 
Resulting outcomes could be transformative in their impact on a regional order that has, for 
decades, elevated regime stability and western interests above the democratic and participatory 
desires of its inhabitants. If given the chance and the right sort of international support and 
conditional strategic aid, a prospective Tunisian, Egyptian, or Libyan democracy will be 
something the people in these countries learn and build for themselves. As many Indonesians 
used to say in the early days of their transition, belajar berdemokrasi (learning democracy). A 
difficult journey has just begun but I cannot see the people of these countries and others wanting 
to turn back. They have confronted their fears, risked their lives and reclaimed their dignity. The 
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taste for freedom of expression and assembly enjoyed by hundreds of thousands of protestors is 
not easily assuaged. I for one will watch with interest to see how these political systems will 
have to adapt. Given the tenor of the last decade, let us just hope that the West starts building 
some bridges for all the ditches it has dug. 
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